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Abstract 
A successful implementation of an overall reform program will enable Georgian banks to provide intermediation and assist in the 
r reform are better now than at 
any time during the last decade. Favorable economic and political conditions and changes in attitude among bank management 
have created an usual opportunities for development and growth. This study attempts to analyze the effects of financial 
liberalization and deregulation on competitive conditions and foreign investment in the banking industry of Georgia economies 
using firm-level data for the period 1999- 2010. 
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1. Introduction 
  Competition is widely accepted as a positive phenomenon for most industries, and this is also true for banking 
effects on capital allocation, firm growth, industrial expansion and economic development. Therefore, research on 
the effect of bank concentration and competition on performance has important policy implications. Economists 
have recognized that financial markets and banks play a vital role in the efficient functioning and development of 
any economy. The health of the financial services industry affects the economy at many levels including individuals, 
firms, and overall national development. (Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Levine, 2004; Levine, Loayze  & Beck, 
2000). 
   Competition in the financial sector matters for a number of reasons. As in many other industries, the degree of 
competition in the financial sector can matter for the efficiency of the production of financial services, the quality of 
financial products and the degree of innovation in the sector. A reason specific to the financial sector is the link 
between competition and stability, long recognized in theoretical and empirical research and most importantly in the 
actual conduct of prudential policy towards banks (Vives 2001). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
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Section 2 gives literature review.. In section 3 I expose econometric methodology and data. Section 5 presents 
empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides final considerations. 
2.Literature Review 
        Many numbers of papers have investigated the competitive condition in banking systems. In one of the first 
papers, Berger and Hannan (1989) investigate relationship between market concentration and profitability using data 
for US banks during the period 1983- 85. They try to separate the effects of non-competitive price behavior from 
those of greater efficiency of firms with larger market shares and find that non-competitive price behavior could 
explain the relationship. 
         study covers three transition economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) in 
the period 1994 to 1999. For the transition economies, the estimated values of the H statistics lie between the values 
of one (perfect competition) and zero (monopoly); although, in the case of Hungary the H-statistic is sufficiently 
close to one that the hypothesis of perfect competition cannot be rejected. This study finds that the competitive 
conditions remain broadly stable between two sub-periods, 1994 to 1996 and 1997 to 1999. 
         The works of Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and of Drakos and Konstantinou (2003) present most of the 
transition economies covered in their paper. Both find that most banking markets in Eastern Europe are 
characterized by monopolistic competition. However, for  Macedonia and the Slovak Republic, Yildirim and 
Philippatos cannot reject the hypothesis that banks act as if they were monopolies or perfectly collusive oligopolies. 
Drakos and Konstantinou accept this hypothesis in the case of E
Yildirim and Philippatos(2007) also find that competition in transition banking has increased over time. 
         Fries and Taci (2002) and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) used the Panzar- Rosse H (1987) statistic to 
measure competition in transition countries.They find that greater competition in a banking market  is associated 
with greater cost efficiency. Yildirim and Philippatos present that greater competition is negatively associated with 
profit efficiency, a finding consistent with competition reducing margins. In contrast, Grigorian and Manole find 
that higher banking market concentration is associated with great cost efficiency. 
 Another study is done in very close neighbor country of Georgia, Armenia, Mkrtchyan (2005) reviewed the 
structure of the Armenian banking industry using data the year 1998-2002 and employing the tests developed by 
Panzar and Rosse (1987). He linked the issues of competition and concentration to test the validity of either the 
marker-power or efficiency hypothesis in Armenian banking. He found that Armenian banking system can be 
characterized as monopolistically competitive, thus supporting the market power hypothesis. 
 Nathan and Neave (1989) also rejected the hypothesis of monopoly and perfect competition for Canadian banks 
over the period 1983-1984. Molyneux et al. (1996) used the same analysis in a sample of German, UK, French, 
Italian, and Spanish banks for the period 1986 to 1989.Their results suggest monopolistic competition in Germany, 
France, Spain, and the UK, and monopoly in Italy.                
 
3. Econometric Methodology and Data 
 
 In this study, the Panzar Rosse (1987) H(henceforth PR)  statistics is used. approach to assess the competitive 
nature of banking markets around the world. The PR H statistics is calculated from reduced form bank revenue 
equations and measures the sum of the elasticity of the interest revenue of the banks with respect to the bank's input 
prices.  
I estimate the following reduced form revenue equations which revenue is explained by factor prices and other 
bank-specific variables that affect long-run equilibrium bank revenues for Georgia for the years 1999 through 2010. 
 
   ln (INTREVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) + h3 ln(PKit) + 1 ln(TAit) + 2 ln(EQTYit) 
  + 3ln(LOANit)+ 4 ln(IBDPit) +  it   (1) 
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is the natural logarithm. The dependent variable (INTREV) is the ratio of total interest revenue (or total revenue) to 
total assets. The model posits that banks use three input factors- namely, deposits, labor, and physical capital. 
Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of these inputs or reasonable proxies: (PF) the ratio of interest expenses 
to deposits and other liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, and (PK) the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets. A number of control variables included to account for size, risk, and deposit mix 
differences are similar to those used in previous studies. These factors are total assets (TA), financial capital 
(EQTY), net loans (LOAN), and interbank deposits (IBDP).         
        Under the PR framework, the H statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticity of the interest revenue with respect 
to the three input prices: The testable hypothesis for monopolistic competition is then, given in 
 
H = h1 + h2 + h3      (2)  
                                  0 < H=h1 + h2 + h3 < 1 
      
The conventional wisdom about the banking market structure of Transition countries is that banks are relatively 
small and industries are very concentrated. Monopolistic competition is therefore a priori the most plausible 
structure for the banking. Since the PR-model is only valid if the market is in equilibrium, thus implying that their 
returns should not be statistically correlated with input prices.A value of H = 0 would indicate an equilibrium in the 
banking markets under investigation. I found equilibrium in my regression, but did not show it here. 
To capture the existence of structural breaks in the banking sector, I focus on the banking sector into three sub-
periods (i) the 1999 to 2003 before rose revolution, (ii) the 2003 to 2006 after rose revolution, and (iii) the 2006 to 
2009 periods. Any statistically significant interaction term would indicate a change in competitive behavior (and 
thus, the H- statistic).Ordinary least square is the simplest and most common estimation procedure employed in the 
P-R literature. I used ordinary least square regression analysis in this research. 
 
4. Empirical result 
 
The econometric results of the estimation of the reduced form revenue equation are shown in Table 1. Basically, 
these results of regression indicate that market structure of Georgian banking system during sample period 1999-
2010 can be explained as monopolistically competitive. This means that banks have some ability to post higher 
prices to their customers due to their unique features like image, brand, and service. 
The table 1 presents the results from the estimation of equation .Using interest income as the dependent variable 
allow for a complete analysis of market power in the banking sector. The interaction terms, for before rose 
revolution 1999-2003, after rose revolution 2003-2006 and 2006-2010 sub-periods, should give an indication of 
whether or not competition changed over the period and the direction of any such change.  
The estimated coefficient most of time have the expected signs and are statistically significant. I estimate interest 
revenue/assets (INTREV). Results do not differ very much from each period. That tells us to verify that in transition 
countries, the banks major role is to act as traditional financial intermediation. 
Although the coefficients on the bank specific factors are of secondary interest to competitive analysis, they are 
reported for the overall sample along with H statistics in Table 1. Note that, the sign on the size coefficient loan to 
assets (Loan) is positive and significant for most of the cases, suggesting that size differentials in assets among 
banks lead to higher interest revenues per dollar of assets for the larger banks. Larger banks seem to be more 
efficient in revenue generating process compared to smaller banks. 
Table 1 show that there was a significant increase in H-statistic (0.15 for the period and after rose revolution) for 
interest income (INTREV) just after rose revolution, implying that the industry became high competitive during this 
period. From 2006 to up to this time, the bank industry in Georgia has weak competition. This contrasts with the 
expectation that financial liberalization would significantly increase competition in the banking sector. However, 
this result is consistent with expectations given the consolidation in the sector. The low and declining H-statistic 
erest income increased after rose 
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revolution.Although the results imply that competition deteriorated following the rose revolution sub-period, the 
hypothesis of perfect collusion was rejected at each stage, suggesting that the industry remained monopolistically 
competitive over the period.  
 
 
Table 1. Tests of competitive conditions dependent variable: lnINTREV 
 
  1999-2003 Periods 2003-2006 Periods 2006-2010 Periods 
Coef. t-sta. Sig. Coef. t-sta. Sig.  Coef. t-sta. Sig.  
(Constant) -1,569 -2,466 ,015 2,588 1,577 ,123 -2,092 -2,684 ,012 
InPF ,163 4,625 ,000 ,214 2,503 ,017 -,041 -2,622 ,029 
lnPL ,069 2,599 ,031 2,021 3,630 ,001 ,272 2,953 ,006 
lnPK -,075 -,847 ,399 -1,549 -2,912 ,006 ,043 1,011 ,321 
lnEQTY ,239 2,463 ,015 -,380 -1,454 ,154 ,136 1,131 ,268 
lnIBDP ,088 2,032 ,045 -,303 -2,854 ,007 -,157 -2,396 ,023 
ln TA ,528 3,201 ,002 -2,770 -3,251 ,002 ,003 2,047 ,063 
lnLOAN -,440 -2,377 ,019 2,763 3,414 ,002 ,119 1,991 ,056 
H Statistic 0,157     0,686     0,275     
Competitive 
condition 
Monopolistic competition Monopolistic competition Monopolistic competition 
R .63    .82    .82    
R-squ 0.48    .75    .72    
Prob(F-stat) .000    .00    .00    
F-statistic 13.54    16.32    17.87    
number of 
observation 
1112    847     956     
ing 




The Panzar and Rosse -
estimated value of H-statistic is equivalent to 0.65 during the overall sample period. Competition of bank market is 
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getting weak from 0.686 to 0.275 after 2006. The test for the market structure of perfect competition or monopoly is 
rejected leading us to conclude that banks earned their revenues in the condition of monopolistic competition. 
The empirical results, for the analyzed period of 1998-2007, have shown: 
    Firstly, that in Georgia there is monopolistic competition. Furthermore, despite the decrease in the number of 
banks during the investigated period and great increase in concentration measures during that time, there are no 
indications of a less competitive behavior of commercial banks in the second half of this period. 
The results of my study suggest that Georgian banks increased their competitiveness especially after rose revolution 
by implementing large scale of privatization and easing foreign participation in the banking sector. I think that it is 
expected to continue to respond to increased competition by doing professional services in traditional market, 
offering new services and products and increasing revenue in non-interest revenues and upgrading their operations 
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